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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, inclusion and participation
have become leading policy concepts within the Dutch
chronic care and social welfare sector. Encouraged by
various government documents and programs, people
with an intellectual or psychiatric disability are no longer
relegated to the margins of our society, but ought to get
a chance to participate in and belong to its mainstream—
on the basis of equality and equivalence (Ministerie
van WVC, 1993; RMO, 2002; RVZ, 2002; Taskforce Ver-
maatschappelijking, 2002; Tweede Kamer, 1995). This
rather drastic, idealistic and practical transformation of
our chronic care and social welfare sector was legally
founded in 2015, by means of four acts: the Community
Support Act [Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning], the
Chronic Care Act [Wet langdurige zorg], the Participation
Act [Participatiewet], and the Youth Act [Jeugdwet].
Although on an international level this pursuit has
been going on for at least five decades, instigated by the
appeal for normalization (Nirje, 1969) or social role val-
orization (Wolfensberger, 1983), it still raises all kinds of
questions and debates. What does it mean if we want
people with intellectual and/or psychiatric disabilities to
participate in our society? What does this participation
demand fromboth civilianswith andwithout disabilities?
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How do (local) governments, institutions and companies
relate to this? Based on which idea(l)s about humanity
do we define equality and equivalence? And by doing so,
how much space is left for individual differences?
In the following dialogue the two authors navigate
the tension between similarity and difference in thinking
about—and working towards—more space for marginal-
ized people. The immediate reason for a joint publication
on this topic is that Kal, while reading several drafts of
Bos’ dissertation on encounters in ‘reversed integration’
settings (formerly sheltered institutional siteswhere peo-
ple without intellectual disabilities become neighbours
of the original residents), sometimes felt dissatisfied
about the way he framed and interpreted the position
of difference, both in practices and in policy documents.
This resulted in discomforting arguments and feelings of
mutual alienation.
The authors chose to write this paper in the some-
what unorthodox form of an open, critical dialogue (see
Abma, 2006; Smaling, 2008). A dialogue of this kind of-
fers the opportunity to explain each of the authors’ own
perspectives before comparing them—through informa-
tive friction (see Kunneman, 2005) and intertwining (see
Waldenfels, 1990)—in order to develop their thinking
about working towards more space for difference.
The leading question, in their joint pursuit through
these swampy lowlands (see Schön, 1987), is not so
much which focus should be preferred—either similarity
or difference—but mainly the possibility of one of those
getting the upper hand. In an attempt to withstand the
contemporary dominance of equality thinking, marked
by a strong focus on tenability and autonomy—and by
extension an increasing climate of taboo around vulnera-
bility and dependency—both authors stress the impor-
tance of recognizing and valuing difference, while dis-
cussing encounters between people with and without a
severe intellectual and/or multiple disability.
2. Responding to Otherness
Gustaaf Bos: I would like to start by saying a few things
about the responsive character of our actions towards
other people. According to the German phenomenolo-
gist Bernhard Waldenfels (1990, 2004) every single en-
counter with another person starts with an uncontrol-
lable bodily response: we see, hear, smell, feel, or taste
‘something’ about the other, before this perception en-
ters our consciousness. Waldenfels states that this pre-
conscious, pre-reflexive perception of the other causes
a confusing, conflicting experience, in which we are at
once both connectedwith and separated from ourselves:
our bodily self is responding while our consciousness is
struggling to keep up. According toWaldenfels the ‘some-
thing’ to which our attention—preconsciously—turns is
always that in which the other differs from us.
Waldenfels typifies this response to the otherness of
the other as the nucleus of human behaviour. In doing so
he rejects contemporary thinking about human interac-
tions, in which the self is portrayed as an autonomous,
rationally and individually acting agent. In Waldenfels’
responsive phenomenology we do not decide a priori
and/or on the basis of rational arguments how we will
relate to another person, but first of all we undergo our
body and that which triggers our senses, before we re-
act (and reflect) consciously on that which touched us.
It goes without saying that the aforementioned bodily
response is everything but ‘pure’ or ‘natural’— it is in-
stead intertwined with our previous (learning) experi-
ences and the contexts, people and cultures in which
those experiences are embedded. This interdependency
however, does not make our response any more control-
lable. Ergo: the otherness of the Other, in the sense of
Lévinas (1969)—a concrete person in a physical, social,
communal, cultural and historical context—puts me in
motion before I know it.
Perceiving otherness is, according to Waldenfels, no
neutral business, on the contrary: the otherness of the
other might trigger and fascinate me as well as frighten
and push me off. No matter how we subsequently react
to this person, the unusual, the unfamiliar, the strange,
attracts us and confuses us, disrupts us, puts us out of
our comfort zone. During the fieldwork I did formy disser-
tation Responding to otherness [Antwoorden op anders-
heid]1 (Bos, 2016), aboutwhat happens in encounters be-
tween neighbours with and without (severe) intellectual
disabilities, I heard many personal stories about this con-
fusion and disruption. The stories came fromparticipants
without intellectual disabilities, and depicted an experi-
ence that I frequently shared (Bos, 2016, pp. 61–67).
Waldenfels points out that we find it extremely diffi-
cult to let this confusing otherness be, to leave it alien.
Many of us cannot accept that the difference between
the other and ourselves is fundamentally unknowable.
Often we equate this otherness and the other, and then
stigmatize and try to avoid it. Even if we are indeed
trying to connect with the other, we rather focus on
shared characteristics and we usually do not pay atten-
tion to that which separates and confuses us (see Walm-
sley, 2001, 2004). However, by doing so we tend to—at
least—lose sight of the otherness of the other, and—in
the worst case—violate it (by means of romanticizing or
ignoring it).
Mostly we do not seem to realize that the contempo-
rary search for and identification of similarities and com-
mon ground between people with and without disabili-
ties is only credible if everyone involved has the oppor-
tunity to contribute. At this point tension arises when it
comes to people with a severe intellectual and/or mul-
tiple disability. How do we understand if there is some
degree of mutual involvement in the search for what
we share? To what extent are people with severe dis-
abilities able to get involved in a search of any kind for
that matter? How can we determine if there is any in-
volvement and/or contribution? And which position and
1 See English summary on http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/handle/1871/53873
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meanings do we grant in this search to the personal dif-
ferences, which are often perceived as more prominent
than the similarities?
The responsive ethics from Waldenfels (2010)—
which stresses the recognition of the unknowable and in-
erasable differences between the other and ourselves—
strengthensmy conviction thatwe should plead formore
space for otherness. Specifically, the acknowledgment
that the perspectives and life world of people with a se-
vere intellectual disability—with whom verbal commu-
nication is (practically) impossible—are fundamentally
unknowable for people without intellectual disabilities,
forces us to give continuous thought to our responsibility
for the way in which we attach form, content and mean-
ing to how we respond to them. Why are we doing what
we are doing? Howmuch space do we—individually and
as a society—offer persons with severe intellectual dis-
abilities to manifest themselves? Which position are we
willing to take in order to give them more space? And
what form of relationship do we want?
Waldenfels’ ethics taught me that, when I want to
interpret my (inevitable, preconscious bodily) response
to the otherness of the other, I have to acknowledge
that this response refers primarily to myself, my familiar
concept of man and worldview, my expectations, pref-
erences and fears—in relation to the other. After all, in
every part of my response to the demand of the other
unfolds our relationship and the way I connect with the
other. Thus my response is part of something that hap-
pens between us. There, literally between our bodies,
is the leeway, the freedom we have; it is there we can
shape our relationship. There, bymeans ofmy body, I can
relate to the otherness, and try to do right by someone.
3. A ‘Passible’ Performance
Doortje Kal: For some reason, the above-mentioned en-
couragedme to dig up an old abstract of a paper frommy
archive that my brother, philosopher Victor Kal, wrote:
Jacques Derrida and messianity (Kal, 2004). I am par-
ticularly triggered by what you write about Waldenfels’
recognition of the unknowable and inerasable character
of the difference between the Other and ourselves. You
argue that this unknowable and inerasable character of
this difference forces us to give continuous thought to
our responsibility for the way in which we shape our po-
sition towards the other, especiallywhen it comes to peo-
ple with a severe intellectual and/or multiple disability.
Perhaps I can even deepen this thought with Derrida.
In my dissertation ‘Setting up camp’: Preparing a wel-
come for people with a psychiatric background [Kwartier-
maken. Werken aan ruimte voor mensen met een psy-
chiatrische achtergrond]2 (Kal, 2001; see also Kal, 2012)
I ‘use’ Derrida (1998), especially in the chapters on hos-
pitality and on normative professionality.
Derrida’s philosophy is labelled as ‘deconstructionist
thinking’ and is thus related to postmodernism,whereby
some define it as ‘relativism’. Derrida passionately and
persistently resists the accusations that in his work
there is no space for responsibility, and that decon-
structionism is irrelevant from a moral and political per-
spective. Insofar as deconstructionism generally aims to
undo exclusion, it sticks with the emancipatory ideals
of modernity!
However, in deconstructionist thinking the criterion
or standard to which we measure or examine this eman-
cipation is not considered to be at our disposal unthink-
ingly; rather it is about a justice that is not to be seen.
As a consequence, we have to postpone the activist at-
titude that marks modernism. This encompasses a pas-
sive moment. At first, one cannot bring the new, or the
otherness (the space for being other) to be by oneself,
and certainly not just like that. In order to welcome dif-
ference, otherness, we have to first know how the other
will feel welcomed. Inclusion, citizenship and participa-
tion do not seem to be adequate terms to make the peo-
ple you refer to feel at home. However, neither do we
feel at home with Wilfred, whom you describe in your
dissertation (Bos, 2016, pp. 72–73), literally strapped to
his bed—and inmyopinionwe should never feel at home
in his situation.
Derrida says that a passive moment does not mean
that deconstruction is without activity. In the last chap-
ter of your dissertation you refer to this—following the
Dutch philosopher Richard Brons (2014)—as a passible
performance (Bos, 2016, p. 310; see Lyotard, 1988). A
passible performance is a specific sensitivity to feel with,
and respond to, the other—not aimed at bringing some
kind of activity to this world, or even to rearrange it.
Rather, the target of passibility is primarily to uncover
the pretentious, apparently closed and definite charac-
ter of texts and notions (and, I add: practices!) as being
premature and not tenable. The effect of deconstruction
lies in that the space which was sealed is made accessi-
ble. For what this space is made accessible stays open.
The activity, which is produced by deconstruction, has a
transient nature. The current norms are temporarily sus-
pended, in order to find out whether or not they need
a transformation or supplement. Meanwhile, the high
justice—as far as I am concerned, the battle against ex-
clusion, and working towards more inclusion, towards
humanity—is not suspended. On the contrary: the afore-
mentioned suspension of active involvement following
certain norms takes place in the name of the latter. Or,
as Derrida puts it: the given right is deconstructable, but
justice is not.
For me, this means that your plea for space for
otherness, your emphasis on our responsibility in the
way in which we treat the other, is still in need of
a more detailed interpretation—starting from this non-
destructible justice.
Gustaaf Bos: Could you elaborate a little on this non-
destructible high justice? I am especially interested in
what defines whether or not something is constructible.
2 See English summary on http://www.kwartiermaken.nl/english/summary-kwartiermaken-doortje-kal
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On what basis is this high justice immune for Derrida’s
deconstructionism?
Doortje Kal: As far as I am concerned your attempt—
listening to the story of the illiterate other, who cannot
speak but deserves to be heard—is an example of this
higher justice. In the meantime, you demonstrate that
the network of chronic care practice (and policy) needs
deconstruction and reflection as well in order to facili-
tate a more valuable and righteous life for those who
are unheard.
At this point I remember a remark that I made in
the first chapter of my dissertation (Kal, 2001, p. 22), A
question of difference, where I emphasize the tension
which is givenwith the quest for the normalisation of the
unknown, the alien (with ‘normalisation’ I refer here to
ceasing the exclusion of ‘the strange other’). Making this
tension a central issue, I argue, always happens against
a background of the eternal dilemma between a radical
stand, which is doomed to stick in powerless purity ver-
sus a feasible activity thatmay compromise andwhereby
one—for the benefit of results—may concede what one
is challenging. I then illustrate this with an example ofme
categorising people with a psychiatric background. Ad-
mittedly, such labelling might lead to stigmatization, but
denying and moving past their otherness leads to exclu-
sion as well. Ergo: it is about enduring this tension, about
not avoiding it, but relating to it (see Boumans, 2013).
Gustaaf Bos: If I get what you mean, I think you
now touch upon a paradox between ‘thinking about’ and
‘working towards’ space for marginalized people. If I fo-
cused solely on developing rational and cognitive knowl-
edge, I would come to the conclusion that it is impossible
to know the other, and thus to really make space for him.
And, subsequently, this would lead me to believe that
there is no point in trying tomakemore space. Therefore,
we are in need of ideals and ethics.
If I understand you correctly, you advocate a decon-
struction of current exclusionary structures, logics, and
practices (à la Derrida), in order to create (temporal)
open space for reconsidering the underlying norms. In
this open space, we should—appealing to high justice—
reflect thoroughly on how we may contribute to the in-
clusion and participation of peoplewho are different and
extremely vulnerable.
Although I attach a high value to your aim and com-
mitment, I also question your argumentation. Inmy view,
an appeal to high justice regarding participation and in-
clusion is not self-evident. High justice may be undecon-
structable, but the operationalisation of concepts and
movements like inclusion and participation surely can be
deconstructed.
Doortje Kal: Indeed, that is exactly my point!
Gustaaf Bos: And if the struggle against exclusion is
awarded the predicate high justice, do you think there
are other concepts and movements, which earn this
predicate just as much?
Doortje Kal:Without a doubt!Humandignitymaybe?
We resist incarceration, isolation, strapping, because
it is inhumane. We must keep looking for dignified
alternatives.
4. Striking Inequality
Gustaaf Bos: Do not get me wrong, I do not intend to
devalue the importance of societal hospitality and toler-
ance towards people who are different and extremely
vulnerable. But I do claim that the way we—as a con-
temporary society, and as researchers and advocates of
amore inclusive society—approach this pursuit, tends to
evade the otherness and the lifeworld of people with a
severe intellectual and/or multiple disability. By strongly
emphasizing the similarities and communality, we are
at risk of entrenching ourselves ever deeper in an un-
reflected presumption that the perspectives and ideals
of people with an intellectual disability resemble those
of people without disabilities. Moreover, that they all
share our needs, dreams and motives. However, in do-
ing so, we seem to forget about the striking differences
in lifeworld and the asymmetrical positions of power (see
Young, 1997).
Doortje Kal: At the same time, we should never dis-
pute that they feel the need for a worthy life. However,
what is dignified for them is not automatically clear to us.
If people themselves are asking to be tied up, it is a real
challenge to find worthy, ‘desired’ alternatives for them.
Gustaaf Bos: Amen. The confusion and alienation I
often experienced during interactions with people with
a severe intellectual or multiple disability in reversed in-
tegration settings—as well as my inability to attach sat-
isfactory meanings to these encounters, in order to un-
derstand them somehow—mademe critical towards the
aforementioned emancipatory equality focus. Time and
again I was astonished, enchanted, frightened, surprised
and/or fascinated by so much otherness. During these
encounters as well as afterwards, incomprehension and
insecurity were reigning. Extraordinary experiences such
as those I describe with Karel (Bos, 2016, pp. 139–140),
Willem (p. 115) and Wilfred (pp. 72–73) made—and still
make—me fundamentally doubt much of what hitherto
was familiar to me. They forced me to question my view
on man, my worldview, lifeworld, motives, expectations,
and ideals—and thus changed my perspective on who I
am. I could not help but recognise that all this prickly and
provocative otherness cohered with my singularity, with
who I was, with how I saw the world and myself.
Doortje Kal: Can you elucidate how? How did you see
the world before and afterwards?
5. Prickly, Relational Otherness
Gustaaf Bos: I am glad you asked. These three encoun-
ters instigated an ever-growing doubt in me about the
recognisability of the perspective of the other. I had be-
gun my research with the intention of imagining the is-
sues and worries of stakeholders with and without in-
tellectual disabilities as correctly as possible—whether
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they could express themselves verbally or not. Due to
my encounters with people like Karel, Willem and Wil-
fred it struckme that, as a researcher, I always performed
frommy own perspective. Although this perspective is in-
evitably shaped by interaction with others, I could never
extract myself from it. Thus, I could never truly and fully
represent another person’s perspective. I would literally
never be able to take the stand of another or walk in his
shoes, simply because he is already (physically) in that
position. And because Karel, Willem and Wilfred barely
used verbal communication, I became more sensitive to
the skewed power relations between them and me—
especially in the academic and policy world, wherein
words, sentences and texts are themightiestmachines to
produce and spread knowledge that counts (see Deleuze
& Guattari, 1987; Jackson & Mazzei, 2013). I could cope
with those machines and have access to them; unlike
Karel, Willem and Wilfred. This rendered me—and all
verbally proficient people in their environment—a more
powerful position than them.
If I was to say anything for a verbally non-proficient
person, I could only do so when I kept an ongoing dia-
logue with him, in all modesty, respecting all doubts and
through explaining my own motives and intentions.
The world and my position therein regarding other
people became less manufacturable, less self-evident,
and at the same time less open-ended than I assumed
in the prelude to my doctoral research. At the start in
2010, I had been quite sure for instance that mutual en-
counters and connections potentially meant an improve-
ment of anybody’s quality of life. Subsequently I deemed
interactions and relations between neighbours with and
without intellectual disability desirable—and with my re-
search I hoped to contribute to their (further) devel-
opment. Throughout my two-and-a-half-year fieldwork
however, I gradually reached the conclusion that I had
failed to take the difficult, uncomfortable, painful and
frightening aspects of difference sufficiently into account.
For some stakeholders with an intellectual disability for
instance, my sheer (often superficial and observing) pres-
ence appeared to be so threatening, that they responded
to it by rejection or aggression, whereas others cowered
frightfully every time I looked at them for a moment or
greeted them while passing by. Because I had not spent
any thought on the possibility of such undesirable en-
counters, which do not enrich the life of the people in-
volved, but rather make them feel less happy, or even
threaten their personality, I had failed to make enough
space for the individual otherness of some stakeholders
with an intellectual disability. I had falsely presumed that
all the persons involved inmy researchwould like to know
the people in their neighbourhood sooner or later, be-
cause their life would benefit from it (Bos, 2016, p. 66).
My growing doubt about something I had deemed
self-evident—i.e. not necessary to prove—before these
encounters took place, forced me to make more space,
and spend more time and attention to interactions with
persons who were most radically different in my view.
But while doing this, I far from gained more insight into
themotives, expectations and ideals of those others, nor
did I knew more about what these people with a severe
intellectual or multiple disability really wanted. As a re-
sult, the growing doubt, insecurity, confusion, fascina-
tion and uneasemademe feel obliged to raise awareness
amongst policymakers about the inerasable and unknow-
able character of the otherness of people with a severe
intellectual disability—at the same time emphasizing the
relational aspects of this otherness.
Here, Waldenfels (2010) is helpful again. In his re-
sponsive ethics, we can try to relate to the other in a fit-
tingway, if we recognize that our (initial) response to him
undeniably refers to something about ourselves in rela-
tion to this person. What does my doubt, confusion, fas-
cination, et cetera tell us aboutwho I am, how I look, how
I live—and about the durability thereof? Moreover, how
do these ways in which I bring order and attach mean-
ing to my perceptions, experiences and emotions relate
to the possibilities I see for contact with these fellow hu-
man beings?
In my opinion, we should try to find answers to ques-
tions like these, if we really want to make more space
for the otherness of people with severe intellectual or
multiple disabilities, and if we want to counteract exclu-
sion in a broader sense—in everyday life as well as in pol-
icy documents. To what extent are we providing space
for inerasable, unknowable, confusing, provocative, and
prickly otherness when we try to include everybody on
the basis of mutual similarities? Additionally, what and
who do we still exclude, even if we strive for full-fledged
inclusion?
6. A Scramble Around the Pulpit
Doortje Kal: Here I completely agree with you: our re-
sponse to the strange other does indeed refer to some-
thing about ourselves, our order, our meaning. This
mademe think about themetaphor of themusical chairs
with only one chair—a pulpit—from the Dutch sociolo-
gist and philosopher Harry Kunneman (1996). Everyone
wants to occupy the pulpit as long as possible, thereby
forcing his way of looking, thinking and speaking—his
interpretation—onto the others. Each discourse how-
ever, excludes alternative logics and ways of expressing
oneself; hence there is always a scramble around the pul-
pit. Some people however, do not dispose of a language
that is appropriate for the pulpit; they use an inappropri-
ate idiom in the view of others. Therefore, they have no
access to the pulpit.
Kunneman points out that Lyotard (1988) coined the
word contravenity for this situation of aphasia. Lyotard
makes an appeal to give voice to the injustice that can-
not be articulated within the confines of a dominant dis-
course. I think that you tried to respond to this appeal
in your dissertation—without knowing exactly, or even
by a long way, what/which injustice the people involved
would like to address.
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7. Responsive Trust
Gustaaf Bos: Ah, this metaphor is very helpful, thank you.
According to Waldenfels, our efforts to community and
connectedness should not be justified by the starting
point of equality and/or bridgeability, but rather by the
recognition of relational otherness. Responsive trust is a
crucial concept here; the conviction that we can do jus-
tice to a confusing other even though we will never be
able to give a complete, adequate and definite response
to his demands. How to develop and shape this trustful
responsive attitude in the best possible—i.e. the most
righteous—way, is in my view particularly dependant on
an ongoing dialogue between the people involved. Bear-
ing in mind of course, that the other might not be able
to express himself in your preferred communicational
style—and vice versa.
Doortje Kal: I totally agree with the previous. You
nicely summarized that I hope that deconstruction will
lead to further reflection on existing exclusionary struc-
tures. As I mentioned before, in my dissertation I talk
about suspensionwhen it comes to this; suspension in or-
der to find out how hospitality might be meaningful for
the ‘strange other’, a person whose movements in our
society (which is dominated by economic performance)
do not go without saying. Subsequently, in my view, this
suspension should also concern reflections on the con-
ceptualisation and implementation of inclusion, partici-
pation or citizenship ideals. Applied to your research con-
text: how canwe prevent these concepts frompassing by
the radical otherness of people with a severe intellectual
and/or multiple disability?
As you know, for policymakers, thinking in terms
of equality and citizenship has an emancipatory back-
ground; after all there was a time that we thought that
people who were different were best off in forests or
dunes, that our society could (or needed) not harbour
these ‘deviants’. I sincerely think that it is important to
recognize that many ‘deviants’ share ideals like auton-
omy, participation in mainstream society, and belonging
with you and me. That is why I think it is unjust of you to
dismiss our government policy at this point so firmly. That
the conditions for the implementation of this policy are
created abominably, or even reduced, is another issue.
Gustaaf Bos: For the record: I only criticize and reject
the dominant policy focus on equality and equivalence
when it comes to peoplewith a severe intellectual and/or
multiple disability.
8. A Person is Never Strange on His Own: An
Interpersonal or Societal Approach?
Doortje Kal: That being said, I do agree with the question
you raise about the exact benefits of the deinstitutional-
ization policy, or even the reversed integration policy, for
people with severe or multiple disabilities.
You demonstrate how very different many people in
reversed integration settings are—and how this other-
ness confuses you. A cumulating doubt, you write, about
everything you had regarded as self-evident, forced
itself upon you. As a matter of fact, this is exactly
the aim of suspension and deconstruction: reflection
on the/your/my/our normality, which does not make
space for the abnormal. But, you say, I could not find
out—no matter how hard I tried—what would help the
people involved.
However, besides the inerasable and unknowable
character of this otherness, you also stress its relational
makeup. The other is so different, so dissimilar compared
tome (and my singularity, my familiarity). In Waldenfels’
vocabulary: we are alien to each other due to each other;
a person is never strange on his own. The perceived oth-
erness always refers back to the perceiver as well.
I think that one of the main differences between us
is that you—in line with Waldenfels—deploy this reflec-
tion very individually, whereas I do this with a rather
societal scope. You thoroughly reflect upon the mean-
ings that ‘normal’ individuals attach to the confronta-
tion with somuch otherness: people whomutilate them-
selves and others, who must be protected against them-
selves, tied up, medically sedated, isolated—perhaps
even more so in reversed integration settings than in the
total institutions of the past (because of the presence of
‘normal’ others).
Waldenfels’ responsive ethics suggests that we can
only begin to relate to a strange other if we recognize
that our response to him undeniably says something
about ourselves in relation to the other. You state that
we have to be aware of this if we really intend to make
space for the otherness of the other, and thus want to
fight exclusion. I agree with you on this. At the same
time, I want to stress that you and I are also part of a
world which co-shapes us, and which we (are trying to)
co-shape towards a world, a society that both recognizes
and welcomes dissimilarity, no matter how complicated
the consequences—consequences I also draw attention
to in my work (see Kal, 2012). All this based on a respon-
sive trust—and this is where we meet again—that a con-
fusing other should not to be avoided but accepted.
Throughoutmywork, I never hide the fact that a ‘nor-
mal’ person might get hurt when he enters foreign terri-
tories, when he literally alienates himself. It is evident
that normality cannot stay the same when encountered
with otherness.
As you well know, I was quite involved with To Flour-
ish, the dissertation of the Dutch psychologist Janny
Beernink-Wissink (2015). Just like your dissertation, hers
is about people with a severe intellectual disability, as
well as serious behavioural problems. The pearl of her
dissertation is the description of a radical change in the
life of Anja, who from an existence dominated by a
regime of safety (you call this ‘the focus on what may
go wrong’, Bos, 2016, p. 168) came to live a flourishing
life due to the interventions of Beernink as a behavioural
therapist. Just like you, Beernink writes critically about
the dominant care system and arrangements.
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In the end, she thinks, Martha Nussbaum’s Capabil-
ity approach can also be meaningful for people with se-
vere disabilities, precisely because this approach conse-
quently connects individual capabilities to the context
(i.e. external capabilities, Nussbaum, 2006). Beernink
illustrates how a meagre institutional environment in
Anja’s case leads to serious behavioural problems, which
in turn resulted in deprivation of freedom, leading to
even more behavioural problems, et cetera.
In your fifth chapter you also sharply analyse how the
culture of an institution (i.e. system) colonizes the life-
worldof both original andnew residents (and indeed yours
as a researcher), and undermines the ‘capabilities’ of ev-
eryone involved. Furthermore, you, unlike Beernink, put
more emphasis on the necessity of reflection—on your-
self as a researcher, stakeholder, ‘normal person’ in that
abnormal context. What does that add to what we know?
I think that both of your stories are necessary. On the
one hand it is good to stress Beernink’s effort to let peo-
ple flourish (more)—with an eye for dilemmas and diffi-
culties. On the other hand, it is good that you (sometimes
rather extensively) identify and give thought to what it
does to a ‘normal human being’ to be confrontedwith so
much otherness, pain and sorrow; how we tend to flee,
to avoid all of this.
I think that the recognition of difference, dissimilar-
ity, leads to the recognition that not everything can be
bridged, but certainly a part is bridgeable, connectable.
That is something you illustrate again and again very
nicely, for example where you describe your encounter
with Betsy (Bos, 2016, p. 198).
9. Making Space for Encounter by Moving Backwards
Gustaaf Bos: I totally agree with you when you say that
it is possible to connect the own and the alien. However,
with this the otherness of the other is not bridged! In-
spired by Waldenfels (2004, 2011), I argue in my disser-
tation that there is an abundance of options between self
and other, but that with that the other is still not known.
At most—and this often is very valuable!—something
happens in an interaction between self and other.
With regard to encounters with people with a severe
intellectual and/or multiple disability, the crux of the
matter is that participantswithout disabilities are respon-
sible for the content of the interaction. That is, the latter
determine in most cases what happens; success or fail-
ure depends on their efforts, their voices. Their perspec-
tives are decisive because the perspectives of the partic-
ipants with severe disabilities remain largely unknown
and because the balance of power between them is in-
evitably skewed. In my view, there has to be a lot more
awareness about this, because nowadays we think and
quite often say that our efforts are in line with what peo-
ple with severe disabilities want, while in many cases we
do not know what they wish for and/or cannot satisfy
what we think their needs are. More than anything, we
interpret what they want, basing their life and the shap-
ing of it on our values, capabilities and limitations. This
might be painful and difficult to acknowledge, but in my
view this is what it is.
Precisely this inerasable difference had to be the
starting point for us to think about, and work towards
more space for otherness. This space might be in staying
with the other despite not knowing. In my dissertation, I
illustrate that working on this space can be done through
humour, playfulness, listening, sensing, and without (too
many) words. Making space is attending to the personal
(stories) while interacting.
Waldenfels (2010) states that a (policy) starting point
from which everybody is—or should be—equal, mistak-
enly neglects that in human interactions and relations,
there is never a ‘ready-made we’; every family, popula-
tion group, congregation, class and community is a ‘bro-
ken we’ at best. He warns that the denying of this com-
munal brokenness might function as a fertile breeding
ground for a tyrannical societal system that does not tol-
erate deviation. Therefore, whenwe perceive something
that (or someone who) is strange to us, we should avoid
treating this a priori as a problem to be solved, but rather
as a stimulus which keeps waking us from the sleep of
normalisation (see also Waldenfels, 2011, p. 164).
That the way we cope with interpersonal differ-
ences—as an inevitable consequence of the unknowabil-
ity of the otherness of another person—will always be
imperfect and will always chafe, does not mean that we
might as well do nothing. On the contrary: recognizing
the brokenness of our efforts forces us into an ongoing re-
thinking and reflection. Hence, the insufficiencywe expe-
rience when trying to do justice to another person is the
driving force behind a permanent searching, responsive-
ethical attitude (see Irigaray, 1974).
Of course, the fundamental unknowability of the
other’s perspective applies to human relations in general,
but it becomes extra apparent in relation to people with
whom we cannot negotiate verbally about meanings—
which is by far themost commonway of sharing perspec-
tives in our society. If we, in spite of this, act as if we
fully understand such a non-speaking other—and liter-
ally try to speak in his place—we will figuratively step on
his toes.
According to Waldenfels, there is only one just way
to speak for another person, and that is to take a step
back, creating space for the other through suspension of
our ideas, our ways, our preferences—and in this case
our very verbal and cognitive drive. From this perspec-
tive, the space for encountering the other only opens up
if we arewilling tomove backwards. Between our bodies;
that is where it has to happen. However, I can only make
it happen there when I realise that the creation and con-
ditions of this space depend on my willingness and abil-
ity to renounce a mainly verbal and cognitive approach
to communication; to suspend my tendency to immedi-
ately attach meaning to what I perceive.
As far as I am concerned this is a big challenge: to
what extent are we able to connect with each other in
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a meaningful way and also with satisfaction, without a
dominance of verbality and cognition? How can we re-
late to each other and to people with severe intellectual
and/or multiple disabilities if we omit words? What will
happen to us if we do? Which barriers will we face, but
also: which opportunitieswill we discover? Andwhat can
we learn about/from such non-speaking others, about
ourselves, and especially about ourselves in relation to
these others—whenwe do not automatically start to talk
in amutual encounter, but consider howwe can respond
best to the way they present themselves to us?
10. A Re-Evaluation of Dependency, Vulnerability and
Solidarity
I suspect that we will start to think in a different, more
small-scale way about inclusion and participation if we
take people with a severe intellectual and/or multiple
disability—the most vulnerable, least articulate, least
heard and therefore least understood—as a reference
point. And I propose wholeheartedly that we do this for
a change!
On the fringes of existing (policy) narratives and prac-
tices, we should introduce another story, another ap-
proach. It goes without saying that I fully back your focus
on the societal responsibility to make space, but in my
view this starts with a readiness to get to know one an-
other on an interpersonal level—human to human. Too
often, Imiss the appreciation of the necessity of personal
engagement and the involvement of everyone’s individ-
ual ethics in contemporary thinking and debates on inclu-
sion, participation and citizenship.
Do not forget that I, with my dissertation, wrote a
critique based on the personal, situational and temporal
stories from people involved in reversed integration set-
tings. For most people to whom I spoke between 2010
and 2013, the lack of space for otherness was a concrete
central issue. I do not claim that my findings are general-
izable, but I do try, on the basis of these personally, situ-
ationally and temporally dependant narratives, to invigo-
rate the dialogue about the precarious position of differ-
ence in the grand narrative of inclusion and participation.
I most certainly do not do this to dismiss the last
twenty-five years’ government policy without question.
However, I do think that in the year 2016 the said policy
still pays unjustifiably little attention to the unknowabil-
ity of the perspectives of people who cannot speak (for
themselves)—and subsequently to our responsibility, as
individuals, care institutions, policymakers, and society
as a whole, to create relational space for them. Space
of encounter, in the words of the Dutch ethicist Herman
Meininger (2013). Policymakers appear to be blind to the
fact that in order to try to respond adequately to the
unarticulated demands of others, all parties need to be
open-minded, attentive, and ready to slow down or go
the extra mile.
The big question, then, is which shared storyline—
one that is adjusted to the personal characteristics of all
protagonists and to contextual features—would get us in-
volved in meaningful encounters with people whom we
might try to evade at first glance. A strong focus on auton-
omy and self-determination misses the point here (see
Reinders, 2008, 2010). It would be better to try to bring
people (with and without disability) together, and con-
nect them with each other through a re-valuation of de-
pendency, vulnerability and solidarity—something you
advocate for in your work too. In this encounter, the per-
sonal stories of the most vulnerable people should take
a central role; the other participants should relate their
stories to these. That is not to say that the personal narra-
tives of the people who want to get acquainted and con-
nected with the vulnerable protagonists, should not be
shared; they might inspire other people to do the same
thing (see Bos, 2013).
Much listening to, and moving with, the other is
needed; much imagination and empathy—in order to
prevent us from automatically (and a priori) interpreting
these stories through the lens of dominant ideals, or cur-
rent policy narratives. If we do so, we will continuously
be provoked to think in new, critical ways about exist-
ing orders of normality and deviation (see Kristeva, 1991;
Meininger, 2008, 2013). Subsequently, what might hap-
pen in the encounterwith another, will never be fully pre-
dictable nor completely up to us.
Doortje Kal: There was a time that I thought (and
said) that people with a psychiatric background were an
interesting point of reference to me, because for them
contravenity—not being able to verbalize what is going
on, because the words of the others are not theirs—
is such an influential phenomenon. But one could also
claim that people with mild intellectual disabilities fall
between two stools, because they belong nowhere due
to that label ‘mild’. And one could take an even broader
scope, by saying that in our society as a whole the space
for vulnerability is waning.
However, if people do notwant to be reduced to their
vulnerability and want to get a chance to flourish in what
they are good at, this should not result in an increasing
taboo of vulnerability—something that seems to be the
case nowadays. This is, however, putting the cart before
the horse; only in a society with space for vulnerability,
can people be truly empowered, to use a popular idiom.
I heartily support your appeal to give also—andmore
often—a voice to the unheard and inarticulate. Besides,
you think the whole movement for inclusion could learn
something from that. Maybe you can elaborate a little
on that?
11. ‘Listening Out’ Personal Stories of Inarticulate
Protagonists
Gustaaf Bos: Well, I think that everyone who supports or
advocates inclusion, participation and citizenship could
learn a lot from what happens in encounters with per-
sons with a severe intellectual and/or multiple disabil-
ity. They could also learn a lot from the aforementioned
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themes—such as dependency and vulnerability—which
are pivotal in their life and that of their relatives.
In summary, trying to find out what is good and im-
portant in the life of what might be the most vulnera-
ble, most marginalized people of our society not only de-
mands sharp eyes and sensitive ears, but also a lot of pa-
tience, time, perseverance, engagement, trust and the
ability to suspend judgement. Put in another way, it de-
mands our willingness and ability to listen out the per-
sonal stories of inarticulate protagonists, without fore-
knowledge about details and storyline. That is both ex-
citing and challenging for many of us, especially since we
tend to have a preferred and dominant storyline in mind.
How do we approach this area of tension?
Doortje Kal: At the same time, this does not mean
that I find community projects that encourage marginal-
ized people (with mild disabilities), such as We are here
[We zijn er] unworthy of our support3. I have under-
lined this before: in my view it is not about either/or,
but about and/and! There is no final answer to these
questions. How do we make fair policies and equitable
institutions, and how do we make sure that the work
is right and has positive results? The murkier the ques-
tions, the more important the moral quest for answers
(see Kunneman, 2013).
How do we struggle with dignity, and how do we ac-
complish informative friction? In swampy lowlands (see
Schön, 1987) it is sometimes hard to get, and stay, close
to each other—and the two of us have experienced this
in our discussions throughout the years. However, this
is no reason to move exclusively on high grounds, or to
avoid prickliness.
First of all, you confronted me with the work of
Waldenfels. He underlines the relational aspect of be-
ing different—one is no other on one’s own—oncemore.
You especially made me think about the inevitable ten-
sion, arising when you stay with the other, the other to
whom I almost unbearably differ, and from whom I per-
haps would rather walk away because I feel incapable.
I hope that our never-to-be-abandoned quest for en-
counter, connection and inclusion—also, or especially,
on the micro-level you have investigated—is of value;
first for the people involved, and secondly the broader
context (which I am a part of!). In Responding to other-
ness, you show encouraging examples of this. All in all,
you strengthen me in advocating being different, in spite
of the criticism I sometimes get for that categorization.
Gustaaf Bos: I am glad to hear that! Your open, virtu-
ally all-inclusive way of thinking encourages me to keep
in mind the great effort, engagement and conviction of
so many who pursue the citizenship ideal. Besides, you
often remindme of the positive effects that thinking and
working from a position of equality—a citizen in a demo-
cratic society—may have on an individual level. With ref-
erence to that, I find what you said about ‘powerless pu-
rity’ versus ‘a feasible activity that may compromise and
whereby one—for the benefit of results—may concede
what one is challenging’ quite helpful. Working on an
ideal that contributes to a better place in our society for
marginalized people—although it may sometimes yield
the opposite of what you aim for—is preferable com-
pared to doing nothing because it may sometimes yield
the opposite of what you aim for.
Encounters with people with a severe intellectual
and/or multiple disability are not a matter of perfection,
but of relation; they consist of a personal intention to
do right by and connect with the other. May the beau-
tiful poem of an anonymous poet on the endpaper of
Dutch ethicist Hans Reinders’ Receiving the gift of friend-
ship (Reinders, 2008) inspire many people to keep work-
ing for more of these spaces of encounter:
Blessed are you who take time to listen to difficult
speech for you help us persevere until we are under-
stood.
Blessed are youwhowalk with us in public spaces and
ignore the stare of strangers, for we find havens of re-
laxation in your companionship.
Blessed are you who never bid us to ‘hurry up’, and
more blessed are you who do not snatch our tasks
from our hands to do them for us, for often we need
time—rather than help.
Blessed are you who stand beside us as we enter new
and untried ventures, for the delight we feel when we
surprise you outweighs all the frustrating failures.
Blessed are you who ask for our help, for our greatest
need is to be needed.
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